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Introduction
Ugalde and Homedes (1) present a
timely discussion of clinical trials sponsored by
large multinational pharmaceutical companies in
Latin America. With a forceful tone and a rare,
ethically justified partiality, the authors discuss
scientific frauds and manipulations of study
results, financial interests disguised as science
and the instrumental use of people in conditions
of social vulnerability. 
The arguments of these authors come
together to demonstrate how preserving
industrial secrecy regarding multinational clinical
trials is valued more highly than the safety of the
people involved. This creates a perverse logic
that makes the social control of research activities
difficult, thus allowing for the concealment of
data manipulation and of serious events that
affect research participants. Undoubtedly, this
article will become one of reference regarding a
fundamental issue of bioethics for Latin America
and for other regions in the world, also called
geopolitically "peripheral” because they are
located outside the central axis of power that
makes the decisions regarding the important
world issues.
In this text we hope to contribute to the
discussion by presenting arguments and informa-
tion that reinforce the position held by the authors
of the work of reference of this debate; however,
we will analyze specific aspects that to a lesser
extent lend a different understanding of the
analysis of the problem or a different point of view
regarding possible solutions.
A bit of history: are international clinical
triales really beneficial to “peripheral”
countries?
Historically, applied research was
developed in close relationship with the industry,
thus supporting interests and rationalities inherent
to the capitalist market and gradually developing
the so-called scientific-technological-industrial
complex. Specifically in the health field, at the
beginning of this process the possibilities of earning
a profit were obviously concentrated in the
development of drugs, in addition to diagnostic and
surgical equipment and all other kinds of medical
supplies. It was with this perspective that the
complex emerged and evolved. In the present day,
one hundred years after the beginning of this
process, it can be asserted that clinical trials are an
eminently industrial activity, and like all company
initiatives they are immersed in the power games of
the free market.
Thus, the production of drugs, vaccines
and medical supplies was developed not as a
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public concession directed at the health priorities
of the population through the solid regulatory
intervention of the State, but rather as any other
marketable product safeguarded by property
protection rules, such as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the respect for industrial secrecy
rightly questioned by Ugalde and Homedes. In this
way, all regulatory effort was focused on technical
safety standards within the production that are
themselves becoming increasingly weaker or, as
the authors state, are simply evaded. 
The eminently industrial character of
clinical trials can be easily demonstrated in
practice. For example, one Brazilian study
discovered, using data from the national public
health authority, that 95% of the clinical trials
conducted in the country were sponsored by the
pharmaceutical industry and the remaining 5%
were split between national companies and
public institutions that promote research (2). The
situation is even worse when the development of
the health industrial complex of a country and
the research capacities of its universities are
weaker. If we take into account that Brazil is
currently responsible for more than 60% of the
all scientific production in Latin America, we can
start to get an idea of the asymmetry and gravity
of this situation within our sub-continent. 
At present, the multinational pharma-
ceutical industry is one of the most powerful
economic conglomerates on the planet. The fact
that the primary patents belong to only 15
companies and that the majority of clinical trials
are related to the control of chronic diseases or
pre-morbid states (such as diabetes, asthma,
dyslipidemia and hypertension) generates a
generally captive market, with business stability
and continuous profitable growth. This panorama
places the pharmaceutical industry in an
advantageous situation in comparison with other
industrial activities. The biggest pharmaceutical
industries have for years invariably occupied the
first places of the world ranking of industrial
wealth (3). By way of example, in the year 2002
the US alone had an economic output of around
200 billion dollars in the sale of drugs (4). 
Ugalde and Homedes submit as a
hypothesis one aspect of the context of
international research with human beings which
is already corroborated in our interpretation:
most of the clinical trials carried out today are
financially rather than scientifically motivated.
Literature reviews regarding the drugs being
developed and their indications show that
multinational pharmaceutical companies orient
their activities towards the same market niche,
leaving aside the diseases that only affect poor or
developing countries, or those rare disorders that
affect just a small number of people.
In this respect, an important study
published in 2006 in Lancet showed that of the
1,556 new drugs developed and registered by the
pharmaceutical industry between 1974 and
2004, only ten were aimed at diseases found
exclusively in developing countries (5). It is
worth noting that it was within this same time
period of approximately three decades that the
expansion of clinical trials towards the
“peripheral” countries occurred, which
demonstrates that, contrary to the assertions of
industry representatives, such internation-
alization cannot be considered truly "beneficial"
to peripheral countries.
other important evidence of these
deviant interests is provided by studies and
reports showing that in the last two or three
decades companies have privileged the
modification of molecules already known and
commercialized with the objective of renewing
for over 20 years a patent for the same
therapeutic indication, or even of competing with
another drug already on the market. As Quental
and Salles-Filho explain, data for the year 2002
from the National Institute of Health
Management (6) shows that more than half of the
new drugs approved by the Food and drugs
Administration (FdA) between 1989 and 2000
were molecules already known that had
undergone some type of simple modification. 
Angell (4), after studying the 415 new
drugs developed and registered by the FdA
during the period of 1998-2002, found that only
32% involved new molecular entities and only
14% were true innovations. The author used the
following criteria to define innovation: indicated
for diseases that had no previous treatments
available, significant superiority in relation to
previous treatments, and reduction of serious
adverse effects. Thus, the inflexible defense of
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placebo use on the part of industry
representatives, and the recent important changes
made in the declaration of Helsinki after the 51st
Word Medical Association General Assembly
held Seoul, Korea in 2008 (7), can be
understood. The so-called “methodological
justifications” for the use of placebos in
conditions "not threatening to human life” aim, in
fact, to maximize private interests (8), allowing
70% or 80% of imitation drugs for chronic
conditions or pre-morbid states to continue to be
produced and commercialized. 
There is abundant data that supports
Ugalde and Homedes’ position regarding the
small impact clinical trials promoted by the
pharmaceutical industry have on the research
capacity of the countries in which these trials are
conducted. In this sense, it is essential to
understand that the research capacity of a country
is directly related to its power in determining
priorities and its independence in developing
projects related to these priorities. That capacity
does not grow simply because private interest
research studies are carried out in a particular
county, whatever the quantity of studies may be.
The development of research capacity depends
on national programs that specifically include – in
addition to the the natural private interests of the
industry – public interests. At the same time,
these programs must stimulate the capacity to
transfer new technologies and practices to local
groups of researchers committed to the public
health priorities of their countries, so as to
contribute to the research independence of the
local scientific community and to society’s power
to regulate and control such research. 
In Brazil, according to the latest
available data from the Comissão Nacional de
Ética em Pesquisa (CoNEP), approximately 79%
of clinical trials protocols with foreign
cooperation conducted in Brazil are phase II and
III, 14% are phase Iv and only 7% are phase I (9).
Specific data on pre-clinical studies of drugs is
not available, but it is assumed that they are
significantly less. This data shows that Brazil,
with regards to international clinical trials, is
incorporated in those phases in which the
development process of a new drug had already
concluded, the patent of the molecule is already
registered, and what is really needed are sick
patients in which to test the drug in order to
register and commercialize it in the country. 
Regarding the limitations
The few points regarding which we
have a different understanding than Ugalde and
Homedes are related to the way of analyzing the
limitations of clinical trials and the suggestions
the authors offer to strengthen the ethical
assessment of protocols in Latin American
countries. Regarding this first point, the authors
seem to group together the methodological
limitations, the limitations caused by economic
interests and the limitations caused by fraud and
data manipulation. Given that these problems
have different origins and require different
solutions, in our opinion it is necessary to address
them individually. 
The methodological limitations (such as
those related to the sample size, especially when
the authors state that a sample of 4,000 or 5,000
individuals is not enough to represent the variety
in the population) must be seen as limitations
inherent to the current level of scientific
development and would even be equally
problematic even if the trials were motivated by
the most legitimate public health interests. The
methodological limitations are those that make
risk an inevitable element in carrying out a
clinical trial. The solution lies in generating a
national or institutional policy of training
research ethics committee members in terms of
better scientific education in specific
methodologies and the competencies necessary
to integrally assess the socio-cultural conditions
of recruited populations and the characteristics of
their everyday ways of life (10). 
However, the limitations caused by the
economic interests of the industries, in our
opinion, exceed the power of the local
committees that monitor research ethics. The
authors' suggestion that the committees become
capable of determining which trials aim at true
innovations and which imitations drugs respond
only to the interests of the industry, in order to
thus avoid their realization, seems to us
incompatible with reality. It is important to make
this clear, both in terms of the essential technical
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requirements needed to distinguish among tested
molecules and in terms of the disparity existing
between the (fragile) powers of the institutional
ethics committees and the (robust) powers of the
international pharmaceutical industry.
The economic interests of the
companies must be regulated exclusively by the
State. The public health authorities of a nation
must be legally empowered to prevent the
participation of national institutions in trials of
imitation drugs and generate agreements aimed
at the development of projects that are priority for
the country. The same occurs with the legal
protection of a secrecy that must be broken,
especially because all the molecules in phase II
and III research are already patented and no
rational or moral justification for such secrecy
exists. Bioethicists and other members of
academia concerned with this problem, as well
as social movements that activate in the public
health field, must stimulate this debate and put
pressure on the State, exactly as Ugalde and
Homedes attempt to do in this work.
Finally, the limitations caused by fraud
and data manipulation exceed the boundaries of
ethics and extend into the field of criminality.
Again, the solution is not found within the
committees but within the State and its legal
system. Public health authorities need to be
pressured by society to create technical research
boards responsible for executing detailed reviews
of protocols and carrying out meta-analysis of
data and facts with the intention of identifying
frauds and manipulation. However, it is
necessary to create strict laws that strengthen the
performance and the legitimacy of national
systems of control and ethical review of clinical
research studies that more forcefully classify the
criminality of deviant company behavior.  
Final remarks
The historical relationship demon-strated
in the last decades in Latin America among the
State, society and the pharmaceutical industry
needs to be changed pragmatically through more
adequate professional training for research ethics
committee members in the region and delineated
by means of new laws and regulations that are
more objective, concrete and consistent. 
Clinical trials were historically
understood as both science and profit. That
reasoning is present not only in how
multinational industries are managed, but also
among health professionals that carry out the
studies in different areas of the world and are
paid according to the number of subjects they
recruit. In general, these people belong to
important regional university research groups that
put their names on articles already written and
developed by the industry so as to be published
in rigorous independent journals. The object of
this criticism may also be an important professor
of medicine, lavished with international trips and
other expensive rewards in exchange for the
influence he or she has over the prescription
choices of young physicians or on the drug to be
used in his or her medical department, an
influence that helps to ensure the profits of the
drug’s sponsors.
Science itself may be an excellent ally
in this struggle, as Ugalde and Homedes clearly
and forcefully demonstrate in their text. 
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